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Chairmen Needleman and Arconti and Members of the Committee, 
 
I’d like to thank the committee for allowing me to comment today. My name is Daniel Lyons, 
and I am a professor at Boston College Law School, where I teach and research in the areas of 
telecommunications, Internet law, and federalism. I am also a Visiting Fellow at the American 
Enterprise Institute, where I have published over 100 blog posts on tech policy issues, including 
the net neutrality and privacy issues addressed in Senate Bill No. 5. But I should note that I am 
testifying on behalf only of myself in today’s proceeding. 
 
I wish to make two points about Senate Bill No. 5. First, it is unlikely that Connecticut has 
authority to enact the bill’s net neutrality provisions, as the bill conflicts with the Federal 
Communications Commission’s carefully balanced regulatory approach and is probably 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause. Second, even if Connecticut could enact SB5, there are 
good arguments about why net neutrality and ISP-specific privacy rules are bad policy. 
 
I.  SB No. 5 is Likely Preempted 
 
In the 2018 Restoring Internet Freedom (RIF) Order,1 the Federal Communications Commission 
repealed federal regulations similar to those that Senate Bill No. 5 seeks to impose on broadband 
Internet service providers. The Commission found that rules prohibiting blocking, throttling, paid 
prioritization, and the general conduct standard were likely to inhibit consumers and competition. 
Instead, the agency chose to rely on enhanced transparency and disclosure requirements, against 
the backdrop of antitrust and consumer protection laws, to promote innovation while protecting 
against the risk of consumer harm. In Mozilla v. Federal Communications Commission, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this rule and found the agency’s explanation reasonable.2 
 
The RIF Order expressly preempted “any state or local measures that would effectively impose 
rules or requirements” that the order repealed or rules that would otherwise be “inconsistent with 
the federal deregulatory approach” taken in the order.3 This is consistent with the FCC’s long-
time approach to state regulation of ISP network traffic management practices. Though the 
                                                          
1 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018) (“RIF Order”). 
2 Mozilla v. Federal Communications Commission, 940 F.3d 1 (2019). 
3 RIF Order at 427. 
agency has flip-flopped over the years on what the rules should be, it has consistently explained 
on a bipartisan basis that traffic management rules are primarily a federal function. For example 
the Obama-era FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order explained that the Commission had authority to 
preempt state regulations that interfere with valid federal objectives and announced it would 
preempt state laws on a case-by-case basis.4 The 2015 Open Internet Order (upon which SB No. 
5 is modeled) was more explicit, explaining it would preempt “state regulations that would 
conflict with the federal regulatory framework or otherwise frustrate federal broadband 
policies.”5  
 
The Mozilla court vacated the RIF Order’s express preemption provision, finding that the agency 
failed to ground the clause in a lawful source of statutory authority.6 But while vacating the 
express preemption provision, the court was careful to preserve the issue of conflict preemption, 
labeling it “wholly premature.”7 Conflict preemption occurs when a state law “frustrate[s] the 
accomplishment of a federal objective.”8 The agency cannot assert conflict preemption in the 
abstract; as the Mozilla court explained,  
 
Because a conflict-preemption analysis involves fact-intensive inquiries, it 
mandates deferral of review until an actual preemption of a specific state 
regulation occurs. Without the facts of any alleged conflict before us, we cannot 
begin to make a conflict-preemption assessment in this case, let alone a 
categorical determination that any and all forms of state regulation of intrastate 
broadband would inevitably conflict with the 2018 Order.9  
 
At first blush, it may seem odd that Mozilla can strike down the RIF Order’s preemption clause, 
and yet leave the door open for a future court to nonetheless find a state law is preempted. The 
resolution of this seeming conundrum lies in the difference between express and conflict 
preemption. Whereas express preemption turns on congressional intent—whether Congress has 
granted the agency authority to preempt state law in an area—conflict preemption focuses on the 
effect of dual sovereigns pursuing different objectives in an area of shared regulatory authority. 
Where state law frustrates the accomplishment of a federal objective, the state law must yield—
preempted not by some express statutory or regulatory command, but by the Supremacy Clause 
itself.10  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. illustrates how conflict 
preemption works in an analogous regulatory environment.11 Geier involved an automobile 
safety standard promulgated by the Department of Transportation pursuant to the National 
                                                          
4 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17970 n.374 (2010). 
5 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5804 (2015). 
6 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 86. 
7 Id. 
8 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). 
9 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 81-82. 
10 Geier, 529 U.S. at 873. 
11 Id. at 861. 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which granted the agency broad authority to 
establish “appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards” in the public interest.12 After 
experimenting with several different standards over time that varied in onerousness, the agency 
settled on requirement that automobile manufacturers equip some, but not all, of their vehicles 
with passive restraints such as airbags.13 After being injured in an automobile crash, the plaintiff 
sued the manufacturer, arguing that failure to provide an airbag violated state tort law despite 
being in compliance with the federal standard.14 The Act contained an express preemption 
clause, but the court found this inapposite, as the clause did not address tort claims. Nonetheless, 
the court found that the tort claim conflicted with the federal standard. 
 
The plaintiff argued that the agency merely set a minimum airbag standard, and states were free 
to adopt more stringent requirements above that minimum.15 But the court found otherwise, 
noting the agency “deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range of choices among 
different passive restraint devices” designed to “bring about a mix of different devices 
introduced gradually over time.”16 The agency specifically rejected an all-airbag standard, in part 
because of concerns about public backlash.17 The court found the state law claim was preempted 
because a “rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as petitioners' 
would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation 
sought and to the phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed.”18  
 
The RIF Order reflects a similar exercise of the agency’s judgment regarding the appropriate 
way to regulate the broadband industry. In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that the 
Telecommunications Act's definitions were ambiguous, and therefore the Commission was free 
to classify broadband Internet access service as either a Title I information service or a Title II 
telecommunications service.19 The scope of the agency’s Title I power ranges, based upon how 
the agency interprets ambiguous grants of authority like Section 706 and what rules the agency 
determines are helpful to execute its clearly defined statutory powers. Similarly, the scope of 
Title II varies, as the statute gives the agency the power to forbear from applying particular 
provisions if the agency determines that “enforcement of the regulation or provision is not 
necessary” or if forbearance is otherwise “consistent with the public interest.”20  
 
This flexibility creates a broad menu of potential regulatory options for the agency to choose 
from, all of which are permissible under the Communications Act as interpreted by Brand X. On 
one end of the spectrum, the agency could opt for a policy of complete nonregulation, 
                                                          
12 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (repealed by Pub.L. 
103-272 § 7(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1379). 
13 Geier, 529 U.S. at 864. 
14 Id. at 865. 
15 Id. at 874. 
16 Id. at 874-875. 
17 Id. at 879. 
18 Id. at 863. 
19 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
20 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2018). 
disclaiming any interest in broadband whatsoever. On the other end, it could apply the full 
panoply of Title II obligations to broadband providers, up to and including rate regulation 
pursuant to tariffs filed with the Commission. Between these poles lie a host of potential 
regulatory bundles, including minimalist Title I requirements, a more robust common-law 
regulatory structure constructed using a more intensive Title I process, or a Title II-lite regime 
that waives most, some, or virtually none of that chapter’s traditional common carriage 
requirements.21 
 
The RIF Order represents the agency’s policy judgment regarding the optimal regulatory bundle 
from among these options. Contrary to the claim made by some net neutrality advocates, the 
agency did not foreswear any jurisdiction over broadband access and abandon the field. Rather, it 
opted to classify broadband as an information service and subject it to specific transparency and 
disclosure obligations, coupled with enforcement of existing consumer protection and antitrust 
laws. But it decided against more intensive common carrier-like economic restrictions, which 
were likely to harm consumers and innovation. Significantly, the Mozilla court found this 
analysis to be a reasonable exercise of the Commission’s authority.22  
 
My sense is that courts are likely to find that SB No. 5 “frustrate[s] the accomplishment of a 
federal objective” by imposing precisely those duties that the Commission explicitly repealed as 
harmful, and by reducing the flexibility that the Commission recognized as important to future 
growth. Here, as in Geier, the agency has adopted a careful regulatory scheme that balances 
trade-offs between more and less onerous requirements. More onerous state restrictions upset 
that balance and therefore are likely to be found preempted by the Supremacy Clause. 
 
II.  Potential Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality Rules 
 
Moreover, even if Connecticut could enact state net neutrality requirements, it’s not clear that it 
should do so. The committee should consider carefully the unintended consequences of a ban on 
all paid prioritization. Net neutrality proponents are correct that prioritization can be misused for 
anticompetitive purposes. But the reality is that there are good and bad reasons why a network 
might prioritize some traffic over others. A flat ban on prioritization risks jeopardizing these 
benefits because of fear the practice will be abused—yet the abuse feared is already largely 
prohibited by antitrust law.  
 
Net neutrality advocates often argue that without a ban on paid prioritization, internet service 
providers (ISPs) would divide the network into fast lanes and slow lanes. This rhetoric envisions 
broadband networks as segmented into various lanes of travel, with packets sorted into channels 
that move at different maximum speeds at all times. But this is only a metaphor, and distorts how 
the Internet actually works. All Internet traffic on a network moves at the same speed. The 
problem is congestion: what happens when users want to transmit more data than the wire can 
                                                          
21 See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1029, 1041 n.64 (2012) (discussing Title II–lite regime). 
22 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 72-73. 
physically manage at a particular moment. In this case, the network must drop some packets and 
allow others to go through. The dropped packets then must be resent, which delays the delivery 
of the service. 
 
Of course, congestion is not constant; it is more likely to occur at times of peak use. The solution 
to chronic congestion is to expand network capacity. But additional capacity is expensive. It is 
often uneconomic to build a network with zero congestion at peak time because this would create 
significant excess capacity at off-peak periods—like building an 8-lane highway that sits empty 
for 23 hours each day. And a zero-congestion network today may nonetheless face congestion in 
the future, as consumers’ appetites for data grow. So some amount of congestion is inevitable. 
 
So how can we address that congestion? One can drop packets randomly, which seems to align 
with net neutrality’s ethos that all traffic should be treated the same. But there’s a problem with 
this model: Different internet content and applications have different susceptibility to congestion. 
A user loading an email or a webpage is unlikely to notice if some packets are dropped and 
resent. But streaming video or FaceTime may buffer, which erodes the consumer’s experience 
and makes the product less reliable.  
 
An alternative would be to drop packets intelligently, by deprioritizing traffic that is less 
sensitive and prioritizing traffic that is more sensitive to congestion. This would improve the 
experience for streaming video (for example) without measurably degrading the web surfer’s 
experience. But this is precisely the solution that many net neutrality advocates would prohibit. 
Note, though, that because different applications have different susceptibility to congestion, a 
ban on prioritization is anything but neutral: it favors apps like email and web-browsing that are 
not congestion-sensitive, over more bandwidth-intensive services that are. My concern is that 
requiring the Internet to always function exactly as it does now can have unintended 
consequences for innovation, as companies seeking to develop the next big application are 
stymied by an Internet architecture that cannot change to meet their needs. 
 
When pressed, some net neutrality advocates will concede the value of intelligent traffic 
management. The problem isn’t prioritization, they claim, but paid prioritization: the protection 
against congestion in exchange for a fee. But once one acknowledges the need to prioritize 
traffic, one then needs a method of prioritization. One solution is a central planning model: An 
expert (likely either a government bureaucrat or a broadband company engineer) can develop a 
master list of all internet-based applications and sort it by priority. This raises difficult questions 
about the sorting rule. Is it based entirely on how quickly the service erodes, or is the expert 
choosing, say, telemedicine over cat videos because he or she feels telemedicine is more 
important? This raises the prospect of government or ISPs picking winners and losers, which is 
precisely what net neutrality is supposed to prevent. The expert may miscalculate an 
application’s sensitivity. And even if the expert gets the list right, it’s hard to maintain in a 
dynamic environment where new services are being added and existing services are being 
improved, which makes today’s congestion-sensitivity calculations less relevant tomorrow. 
 
Alternatively, we can use the price mechanism, which is the way we generally allocate scarce 
resources (like bandwidth) in a capitalist society. Hayek taught that prices reveal information that 
markets can use to sort claims on a decentralized basis. An application developer will only 
purchase prioritization if its service is congestion-sensitive. When it is willing to do so, and at 
what price, reveals how susceptible it is compared to other apps. This sorts apps with less error 
and fewer value judgment than a centrally planned solution. 
 
The concern, of course, is that the price mechanism harms those who cannot afford to pay for 
prioritization. But these concerns are somewhat overrated. First, apps that are not congestion-
sensitive have no need to pay for prioritization. Second, even in a net-neutral world, there are 
other ways that well-funded companies can — and do — pay to reduce their exposure to 
congestion, such as using content delivery networks to bypass the public internet.  
 
III.  ISP-Specific Privacy Rules are Bad Policy 
 
The bill’s privacy provisions are also based on a now-defunct FCC rule. But unlike the net 
neutrality rule, the FCC’s privacy rules never came into effect, as Congress repealed them 
through the Congressional Review Act procedure, which prohibits the agency from adopting a 
new rule substantially the same as that which was repealed. 
 
Repeal of that misguided effort was the right decision for two reasons. First, given the 
competitive dynamics of the Internet ecosystem, it makes very little sense to single out Internet 
service providers to bear a greater privacy burden than other companies. Second, when leveling 
the playing field, an opt-out privacy model is preferable to an opt-in model. 
 
First: As many (including me) noted when the FCC passed its rules, it is a mistake to create a 
new, more stringent privacy regime that applies to ISPs but not Internet-based companies such as 
Google, Amazon, and Facebook. This creates an unlevel playing field in the market for digital 
advertising dollars. Supporters justify this disparate burden by highlighting the allegedly 
“privileged place” that ISPs occupy in the network, by controlling the wires that carry 
information to and from the consumer’s home. But this is misleading. My home broadband 
provider can only gather, at most, information about my online activity while I am at home. By 
comparison, Google can capture all my activity while logged into my Google account whether at 
home, at work, or on mobile networks, if, like me, you use a phone powered by Google’s 
Android operating system. Furthermore, technological limitations such as encryption and use of 
virtual private networks significantly limit what information ISPs can gather from the data to 
which they have access. The notion that an ISP is in a privileged position vis-à-vis edge 
providers is, at best, questionable. 
 
Putting ISPs at a competitive disadvantage in the digital advertising market is especially 
problematic because ISPs were late to the digital advertising game. Studies suggest that as much 
as 2 out of every 3 dollars spent on digital advertising goes to only two companies: Google and 
Facebook—which is an astounding figure when you consider the broad array of advertising-
supported content available online. ISPs have the potential to be disruptive innovators in this 
market. This means that a regulatory regime that makes it harder for ISPs, but not edge 
providers, to collect and monetize data not only tilts the playing field, it tilts it in favor of 
incumbents and against innovation. Ultimately that’s bad for consumers and for competition. 
 
It's worth noting that there is an important distinction between the now-defunct FCC privacy rule 
and SB No. 5.  The FCC did not choose between a two-tier privacy regime and a uniform set of 
rules to govern all companies equally. Rather, the FCC created ISP-specific rules because it 
lacked jurisdiction over the rest of the Internet ecosystem. Supporters of the FCC rule saw it as a 
transition measure—they hoped that an opt-in rule for ISPs would prompt lawmakers to create 
similar opt-in measures for other companies as well. It is also worth noting that the FCC rule 
never came into effect, as Congress invalidated the rule through the Congressional Review Act 
process before its effective date. 
 
Second, Even if regulators sought to impose a uniform privacy rule across the Internet 
ecosystem, it’s a mistake to favor an “opt-in” regime over an “opt-out” one. Proponents of the 
bills discussed above make a mistake that is, unfortunately, all too common in this debate: they 
consider privacy in a vacuum, without considering the role that consumer data plays as the 
lifeblood of the Internet ecosystem. It is the monetization of customer data that allows Google, 
Facebook, and countless other companies offer the “free” services that we all take for granted as 
the modern internet experience—and may someday bring broadband prices down as ISPs cover 
more of their fixed costs with advertising rather than subscription dollars.  
 
In both an opt-out and an opt-in regime, consumers have ultimate control over how their data is 
collected and used. The difference is that an opt-in rule dries up the pool of data available for 
monetization, by prohibiting companies from accessing data on consumers who are indifferent to 
the practice. At a minimum, this reduces revenue available for research and innovation and can 
cause companies to reduce the quality of their products to compensate. At worst, an opt-in 
regime means those companies might start charging for services that they currently provide for 
free and higher prices for goods that could otherwise be subsidized through advertising—thus 
widening the digital divide by stratifying available services between the haves and have-nots.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
It’s worth noting that the current light-touch regulatory framework for traffic management and 
privacy is the historical approach. The RIF Order that SB No. 5 implicitly undermines restored 
the legal regime that was in place through much of the Internet’s history prior to 2015. And the 
federal government has never enforced binding opt-in rules on ISPs. Contrary to claims by some 
advocates, the federal government has not abandoned the field, leaving a regulatory void that 
states must rush to fill. The Federal Trade Commission has authority to police anticompetitive 
behavior and has exercised that authority, including in the privacy arena. Although broadband 
providers do have some incentives to behave in an anticompetitive fashion, antitrust law protects 
consumers from the harms that net neutrality advocates fear most, just as it shields consumers 
from anticompetitive harm everywhere else in American society. It is a mistake to adopt 
prophylactic state rules because of the specter of a few bad actors that antitrust law already 
disciplines, particularly given the risk that these new rules may have severe unintended 
consequences.  
 
